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Abstract. This paper investigates the effectiveness of planning prompts on organizations’
tax compliance behavior. We conducted a large-scale, multi-wave field experiment ex-
amining the tax-paying behavior of all organizations that failed to file timely annual
returns for a payroll tax in the province of Ontario. Organizations were randomly assigned
to receive one of two letters: Ontario’s standard late notice (control) and a revised ex-
perimental late notice, which included step-by-step instructions of when, where, and how
to file a return. Our data indicate that planning prompts are effective at increasing or-
ganizations’ timely tax payment. In addition to replicating these findings across two
waves, we demonstrate that, although our intervention did not appear to have effects that
persisted across tax years, organizations also did not habituate to our manipulation and its
effects were consistent across repeated exposures. Our study is among the first to dem-
onstrate that a simple behavioral intervention that has typically been applied to individuals
to help them to act upon their existing motivations can be effective in the realm of tax
compliance and organizational behavior.
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1. Introduction
How can governments effectively increase tax com-
pliance and, more specifically, increase the payment
of overdue taxes? This question is of critical impor-
tance because efficient funding of public services
involves both levying tax and minimizing collection
costs (Andreoni et al. 1998), yet compliance continues
to be an ongoing problem (Matsaganis et al. 2012). For
example, in 2011 it was estimated that outstanding
tax debt totaled approximately USD 650–700 billion
across OECD countries (OECD 2014). The traditional
approach to increasing tax compliance, used uni-
versally by governments, is to apply financial disin-
centives for noncompliance (e.g., penalties, interest,
and fines), thereby providing taxpayerswith extrinsic
motivation to pay their dues in a timely fashion. Addi-
tionally, some governments have examined applying
insights from behavioral science to increase individuals’
tax compliance, for example by providing details of
other taxpayers’ behavior to make social norms and
the moral costs of noncompliance salient and bolster
taxpayers’ intrinsic motivations to file (Torgler 2007,
Hallsworth et al. 2017). In this paper, we examine a
behavioral approach that has yet to be applied to tax
compliance: encouraging organizations to act on their
existing motivations through the use of planning
prompts (see Rogers et al. 2015 for a review).
Although there has been considerable research into
how behavioral insights may be applied to enhance
individuals’ decisions, less is known about the ef-
fectiveness of such interventions when it comes to
organizational actors (OECD 2017a). Moreover, most
empirical research on tax compliance has been con-
ducted at the individual level, and organizational tax
compliance remains a relatively underexplored but
growing area of research (Alm and McClellan 2012,
Hallsworth 2014). To address these gaps, we test
the efficacy of a novel approach to tax collection—
employing planning prompts—using a large-scale,
organizational field experiment. Notably, because
our field experiment features two waves, this re-
search is also able to explore the longer-term impact
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of our intervention (i.e., over two tax years) including
testing for replication, habituation, and the persis-
tence of our effects.
2. Theoretical Approach
Although the most well-studied approach to increasing
tax compliance is the use of penalties and fines to de-
crease noncompliance (Allingham and Sandmo 1972),
research suggests these extrinsic motivators may not
be the only drivers of compliance behavior. For one,
if these disincentives were the only drivers of com-
pliance, expected utility models would actually predict
higher levels of noncompliance, given the low proba-
bilities of being selected for audit in most jurisdictions
(e.g., Skinner and Slemrod 1985, Slemrod andYitzhaki
2002). Moreover, other research finds that individ-
uals’ and organizations’ intrinsic motivations to pay
their taxes, otherwise known as tax morale (Luttmer
and Singhal 2014), is predictive of their compliance
behaviors (e.g., Alm and Torgler 2006, Cummings
et al. 2009, Alm and McClellan 2012). As a result,
governments have shown increasing interest in sup-
plementing the more traditional approaches (e.g., fi-
nancial disincentives) with techniques from behav-
ioral science to achieve their policy objectives (Benartzi
et al. 2017, Pomeranz 2017).
Indeed, there is a growing body of work demon-
strating how seemingly small contextual factors—
such as defaults (Johnson and Goldstein 2003),
framing (Tversky andKahneman 1981), simplification
(Sunstein 2013), and descriptive norms (Goldstein
et al. 2008)—can be used to nudge individuals’ be-
haviors and improve outcomes across a variety of
domains including education, health, the environ-
ment, and finance (Behavioural Insights Team 2014,
OECD 2017b). Nudges aim to leverage our under-
standing of human decision making, including in-
dividuals’ reliance on heuristics, cognitive limita-
tions, and biased processing, to affect behavior in a
predictable way and maintain individuals’ freedom
of choice (Thaler and Sunstein 2008). One commonly
applied behavioral intervention in the area of tax
compliance is leveraging tax morale, which is driven
in part by perceptions of fairness, trust, and social
norms regarding compliance (see Arcos Holzinger
and Biddle 2016 for review). For example, in two
large-scale natural field experiments, Hallsworth et al.
(2017) demonstrated that including descriptive social
normmessages in tax reminder letters (e.g., “Nine out
of ten people pay their tax on time”), as well as
messages highlighting how taxes contribute to the
common public good (e.g., “Paying tax means we all
gain from vital public services like the NHS, roads,
and schools”), significantly increased payment rates
for individuals’ overdue tax. In line with research on
conditional cooperation, these findings support the
proposition that providing information about high
levels of compliance increases taxmorale and, in turn,
increases compliance behaviors (Torgler and Schneider
2005, Frey and Torgler 2007, Alm et al. 2017). Con-
versely, field experiments in which individual tax-
payers were reminded of prescriptive norms (i.e.,
that they ought to comply with tax law) have found
no effect on either imputed tax evasion (Blumenthal
et al. 2001, Ariel 2012, Torgler 2013) or timely tax
payment (Torgler 2004). Thus, there is some evidence
that norms can be leveraged to increase tax compliance—
not by reminding taxpayers of their abstract duty, but by
informing them that their fellow citizens accept and
support the same social contract. However, the vast
majority of applied behavioral research has focused on
individuals’ behaviors, and to date, field experiments
remain rare in organizational research (Scandura and
Williams 2000, Eden 2017, Hauser et al. 2017).
Advancing our understanding of organizations’ tax
compliance is critically important because of the role
they play as both remitters of sales and income taxes
and as subjects of corporate tax. Indeed, in Ontario
where our field experiment was conducted, the taxes
that organizations pay make up over 18% of the gov-
ernment’s total tax revenue (Government of Ontario
2016). Yet, despite the breadth of research on ap-
plying behavioral research to improve individuals’
behaviors, we know relatively little about how such
tools influence organizational behavior (OECD 2017a).
On the one hand, because organizational behavior is
ultimately decomposable to the behaviors of indi-
viduals, one might expect the effects of choice ar-
chitecture and nudges to be isomorphic across levels
of aggregation. On the other hand, there are well-
establishedways inwhich the processes of organizing
and making decisions in groups can alter the con-
structs on which behavioral interventions operate. One
reason to expect reduced efficacy is that, compared with
individuals, decision makers within organizations are
more likely to benefit from cognitive support systems,
such as training, bureaucratization, and technology, that
can reduce reliance on heuristics and biased decision
making (Weber 1922, Stinchcombe 1990). Moreover,
experimental comparisons between individual and
group decision making generally find that groups act
more rationally (see Charness and Sutter 2012, Kugler
et al. 2012, for reviews). Another reason nudgingmay
be less effective when it comes to organizations is that
some established interventions, such as social norms,
work by increasing themoral cost of a particular (in)
action (Hallsworth et al. 2017). Although individuals
are acutely sensitive to their personal moral identity
(Mazar et al. 2008), groups of individuals tend to
experience a sense of diffused responsibility and de-
individuation (Bandura 1999). Inotherwords, ingroups,
there may be a decrease in moral costs.
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Likewise, the majority of empirical research on tax
compliance has been conducted at the individual
level (see Hallsworth 2014, Mascagni 2018, for re-
views). Solutions that improve individuals’ tax compli-
ance need not necessarily be effective when it comes to
organizational actors. For example, although survey
evidence suggests that, similar to individuals, firms
with higher tax morale evade less than firms with
lower tax morale (Alm and McClellan 2012), in one of
the few published field experiments involving or-
ganizational tax compliance, Ariel (2012) finds a
moral suasion intervention to be counterproductive,
having no impact on an organization’s compliance
and even decreasing tax revenues. Similarly, a field
experiment focusing on new firms found that supervi-
sion by tax administration actually reduced compli-
ance (Gangl et al. 2014). Although organizational tax
compliance is a growing area of inquiry (e.g., for
recent field experiments see Iyer et al. 2010, Ronconi
et al. 2015, Chetty et al. 2014, Pomeranz 2015, Kettle
et al. 2016, Brockmeyer et al. 2019) more research is
needed to further our understanding of and develop
effective solutions for organizations.
In order to address these gaps, we conducted a field
experiment testing the effectiveness of one of the most
well-established behavioral interventions—planning
prompts (Rogers et al. 2015)—on organizations’ tax
compliance behavior. Planning prompts encourage
individuals to develop simple, concrete plans, which
clearly articulate the when, the where, and the how of
action (Gollwitzer and Sheeran 2006). For example,
individuals are significantly more likely to get a flu
shot when prompted to select a feasible date and time
to receive the shot, as compared with simply being
provided information about when and where shots
are available (Milkman et al. 2011). Forming precise
planshas been shown to increase follow-throughbecause
doing so increases one’s commitment to their goal
(Rogers et al. 2015). Moreover, forming specific plans
can help individuals get started on their goals, overcome
procrastination, and counteract forgetfulness by remind-
ing them of their goals at key points in time (Rogers et al.
2015). Planning prompts can impact behavior in both
the short and the longer term, as they detail specifi-
cally what should happen at a given point in time
(Gollwitzer 1999). This approach has previously been
shown to be effective for encouraging a number of indi-
vidual behaviors, including completion of course proj-
ects (Gollwitzer and Brandstätter 1997), voter turnout
(Nickerson and Rogers 2010), and cancer-screening
behavior (Milkman et al. 2013). To the knowledge of
the authors, however, it has not yet been applied to
organizational behavior nor to tax compliance.
That said, there is reason to believe that planning
prompts may be effective in a tax setting. Firstly, plan-
ning prompts are especially effective when targeting
goals tied to personal values (Koestner et al. 2002).
Research on tax morale illustrates the importance of
intrinsic values on tax compliance (e.g., Torgler 2002,
Wenzel 2005, Frey and Torgler 2007, Kirchler 2007,
Torgler 2007, Kirchler et al. 2008, Alm and Torgler
2011, OECD 2013). Second, planning prompts share
some similar features with the U.K. Behavioural In-
sights Team’s EAST framework (easy, attractive,
social, and timely) for encouraging behavior change,
which have been shown to improve individuals’ tax
compliance (Behavioural Insights Team 2014). Ad-
ditionally, a personal finance reference book recom-
mends that individuals form specific and detailed
plans to combat procrastination when filing and
paying taxes (Spann 2009). Given that a number of
organizationsmay be latefiling taxes because they fail to
act on their existing motivations, we predicted that
planning prompts would increase their tax compliance
behaviors. In contrast, if liquidity constraints alone
explained late filing, our changes should not affect or-
ganizations’ compliance.
Finally, despite the importance of understanding
the temporal dimensions of behavioral interventions,
relatively few field experiments can speak to longer-
term effects because most administer and measure an
intervention’s effect only once (Frey and Rogers 2014,
Mascagni 2018). Given that our field experiment
features twowaves, we are able to examine the effects
of repeated exposure to our intervention. One im-
portant temporal aspect is whether an intervention’s
effects persist once stopped. Several factors can in-
crease the likelihood that a behavioral intervention
would have a persistent impact including the for-
mation of habits, changing fundamental beliefs, social
changes that reinforce the behavior, or a change in the
repeated future costs of a behavior (Rogers and Frey
2015). Given that our interventionwas not expected to
operate by any of these mechanisms, we predicted
that the effects would not persist once the interven-
tion was removed. Another important temporal as-
pect to consider is habituation, that is, whether re-
peated exposure to the same intervention alters its
effectiveness (Rogers and Frey 2015). Identifying
whether habituation occurs is critical in the realm of
tax compliance, as tax payers are liable to be exposed to
the same collection process year over year. Although
research has shown that people habituate to stimuli
with repeated exposures (Thompson and Spencer 1966),
it has also been found that habituation can be miti-
gated both when the interval between exposures is
long (Rankin et al. 2009) and when the stimuli only
leads to temporary, and nonpermanent, changes in
behavior (Rogers and Frey 2015). Given that there is
an entire year between exposures in our context and
that we expect the initial behavior change to be
temporary, we predicted that our intervention would
Robitaille, House, and Mazar: Multi-wave RCT Nudging Organization Tax Compliance
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be equally effective across more than one exposure
and we would find no evidence of habituation.
3. Field Experiment
3.1. Research Setting and Sample
To test the effectiveness of planning prompts on tax
compliance, we partnered with the Government of
Ontario to run a large-scale field experiment in-
volving organizations that failed to file their employer
health tax (EHT) return on time. In the jurisdiction-wide
experiment, we tested an experimental late notice
against the standard late notice used by the govern-
ment, the latter of which served as our control. In order
to establish the replicability of any findings and to
examine the longer-term impact of our intervention,
including testing for habituation and the persistence of
our effects, we conducted a two-wave field experiment
in the 2013 and 2014 tax years. In both waves, the
control and experimental notices were the same, but
random assignment of organizations to each notice
was carried out independently both years.
The tax that served as the subject of this field
experiment (EHT) is an annual payroll tax on re-
muneration paid to employees. All organizations
with permanent establishments in Ontario and pay-
rolls greater than $400,000 are subject to EHT, con-
stituting a tax base of some 85,031 organizations in
2013 and 79,912 organizations in 2014. The majority of
these organizations (59.6% in 2013 and 61.7% in 2014)
paid this tax by installments rather than by annual
return, either by election or because they had payrolls
greater than $600,000 and were required to do so. The
remaining organizations (34,360 in 2013 and 31,773 in
2014) paid the entirety of this tax by the annual return,
which is due to be filed on or before March 15 or the
following business day each year. Those organizations
that payby installments are also required tofile returns
to confirm that their installment payments are correct
or to reconcile any differences between the install-
ments and the final amount of tax owed. In both years,
all organizations were reminded of their requirement
to file their annual return via a letter that contained
the necessary paperwork, which was mailed to their
business address inmid-January. Options for filing the
annual return included by mail, at in-person service
centers, and via a website.
Organizations that fail to file an annual return by
the due date are subject to financial penalties, interest
charges, and collection efforts encouraging timely tax
remittance. On the business day following the tax’s
due date (March 15), unfiled accounts are automati-
cally and immediately charged a penalty of five per-
cent of the amount owed, plus a one percent penalty
for each full month delay of payment, as well as a six
percent annualized interest charge compounded daily.
Despite these costs, 6,406 organizations in 2013 and
6,291 in 2014, or about 7.5% and 7.9% of the subject
population, respectively, failed to file a return by the
due date. Of these late filers, 6,316 organizations in
2013 and 6,189 in 2014were included in our analyses as
they had not filed their taxes by the estimated delivery
date of the late notice,which served as the independent
variable of our experiment.
Ten days after the late notice letterwas posted other
collection efforts commenced, including the posting
of a second letter and phone calls by collection agents.
These additional efforts were held constant across our
entire experimental sample. Data on organizations’
filing behavior was extracted over six months after
this late notice was sent to organizations. Our focus
on timely tax payment behavior has the advantage
of a readily operationalizable behavioral metric, as
compared with tax evasion, for example, which is
usually measured by proxy variables of questionable
validity (such as the size of tax declarations and de-
ductions; Slemrod and Weber 2012). For additional
details about the research setting and sample please
refer to the online appendix.
3.2. Methodology
Organizationswere randomly assigned to receive one
of two letters: a control notice, which was the stan-
dard late notice sent to delinquent organizations in
years past; and a revised late notice, which included
our experimental manipulation. The decision to in-
clude only two letters in the experiment was made
collaboratively with our government partners on ac-
count of feasibility constraints and statistical power. It
was furthermore decided that assignment to letters
would be balanced such that in both waves approxi-
mately 40% of organizations would receive the control
letter and 60% the experimental letter, in the hopes of
maximizing the predicted benefit of conducting the in-
tervention while preserving the empirical rigor of the
experiment. This over-assignment to the experimental
condition also gave us greater statistical power to test for
persistence and habituation effects, since organizations
were only included in both waves of the experiment if
they were sufficiently late filing their returns both years.
Comparisons across multiple variables (see Ap-
pendix Table A1) revealed that random assignment
successfully created two groups of organizations that
were approximately equivalent in terms of the pro-
portion of foreign organizations, years of experience
filing this particular tax, and amount of tax owed, as
well as in terms of the number of organizations that
received the late notice in error because the govern-
ment mailing list had not been updated to reflect the
fact that they had recently filed or that the organi-
zation was not required to file a return. In addition,
across both waves, domestic organizations took less
time to file than foreign organizations after receiving a
Robitaille, House, and Mazar: Multi-wave RCT Nudging Organization Tax Compliance
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late notice (wave 1: b = −23.46, standard error (SE) =
3.81, t(6,273) = −6.16, p < 0.001; wave 2: b = −16.86,
SE = 2.58, t(6,100) = −6.53, p < 0.001). Also, organi-
zations with more years of experience filing this tax
took less time to file (wave 1: b = −0.46, SE = 0.10,
t(6,274) = −4.61, p < 0.001; wave 2: b = −0.12, SE = 0.07,
t(6,100) = −1.91, p = 0.056). Finally, in wave 2, we
found that organizations with larger payrolls took
less time to file after receiving a late notice (b = −0.15,
SE = 0.00, t(6,100) = −3.73, p< 0.001). However, due to
random assignment, these variables cannot account
for our findings reported below, do not affect our
results when controlled for, and do not significantly
interact with our intervention. See Appendix Table A2
for a correlation matrix displaying these relationships.
As can be seen in Figure 1, the major differences
between the control and the experimental letters
were (1) the reorganization of available informa-
tion into explicit step-by-step instructions of how
and where to file a return, and (2) the addition of
a deadline (when), thus furnishing organizations
with the three critical pieces of information con-
tained within planning prompts (when, where, and
how; Gollwitzer et al. 2004, Rogers et al. 2015).
Although many empirical applications of planning
prompts ask individuals to form their own goals, we
provided the specific when, where, and how plan for
the organizations. It is important to note that the vast
majority of organizations (97% in wave 1 and 99.9% in
wave 2) had previous experience filing EHT returns
and, thus, should have already known when (i.e., as
soon as possible to accumulate the least amount of
penalty), how, andwhere tofile a return.Moreover, this
informationwas sent to the organizations in their initial
requirement to file letter and is readily available on the
ministry’s website. Therefore, although the informa-
tion in the experimental letter was likely not new to
organizations, we hoped to prompt recipients to act
by reorganizing it into a simple, actionable plan. Previ-
ous research has shown that rearranging letters in
such a way can be very useful for drawing attention
to the focal information for firms to attend to (Thaler
and Sunstein 2008, Dulleck et al. 2015).
Both the control and experimental letters informed
organizations that their tax return had not been re-
ceived by the March 15 due date, that the return must
be filed immediately to prevent further charges
and referral to the collections branch, and that
Figure 1. Control and Experimental Letters
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continued failure to file is a serious offence. The
action-deadline (when) provided in the experimental
letters was May 2 for the 2013 tax year and May 1 for
2014, which was 10 days after the late notice was
posted. Deadlines are an effective tool for overcoming
procrastination (Ariely and Wertenbroch 2002), and
this specific deadline was chosen because it both
marked the initiation of additional collection efforts
across conditions and it could be viewed as a more
concrete goal than asking someone to pay “imme-
diately” (concrete goals generally produce better
performance than abstract goals; Locke and
Latham 2002). Additional stylistic differences be-
tween the control and experimental letters (second-
person pronouns, active voice, and reorganized letter
structure) supported the planning prompt inter-
vention, without largely changing the meaning or
reading difficulty1 of the two letters. Therefore, we
argue that this experiment provides an imperfectly
controlled, but informative test of the longer-term
usefulness of planning prompts in expediting orga-
nizations’ payment of overdue taxes. For a short
survey experiment examining individuals’ per-
ceptions of the two late notices please refer to the
online appendix.
3.3. Results of Wave 1
The results obtained from wave 1 of the experiment
supported our prediction: Late notices that included
planning prompts increased organizations’ tax com-
pliance behavior. As can be seen in Table 1, compared
with the control letter, the experimental letter sig-
nificantly reduced the time it took organizations to
file their annual returns by an average of 4.4 days
(b = −4.38, SE = 1.66, t(6,273) = −2.65, p = 0.008,
d = −0.07).2,3 These results suggest that procrastina-
tion and forgetfulness after receiving the late notice
may, in fact, explain some of organizations’ late filing
behavior. Also consistent with our prediction that
including a concrete deadline date (rather than the ab-
stract injunction “immediately”) would expedite filing
behavior, a multinomial regression analysis—with a
reference category of organizations that took more
than 30 days after the late notice to file their annual
returns—revealed that the experimental letter sig-
nificantly increased the likelihood of filing before the
10-day deadline contained in the late notice (b = 0.44,
SE = 0.07, Wald = 37.16, p < 0.001, odds ratio (OR) =
1.54, 95% confidence interval (CI) [1.34–1.78]). In
contrast, during each of the two 10-day periods af-
terward, the experimental letter did not lead to any
significant differences in the likelihood of filing
(1–10 days after the deadline: b = 0.12, SE = 0.07,
Wald = 2.90, p = 0.089, OR = 1.13, 95% CI [0.98–1.29];
11–20 days after the deadline: b = −0.12, SE = 0.07,
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The fact that those organizations that received the
experimental letter did not file any sooner after the
deadline than the control group is likely caused by
the start of additional collection efforts, which tar-
geted all organizations remaining in default. Nev-
ertheless, although these additional collection efforts
gradually decreased the difference between the control
and the experimental letters, as can be seen from
Figure 2, it took over 10 weeks before the initial impact
of the experimental letter was matched by sustained,
human-resource-intensive collection efforts.
To ascertain the financial value of our experimental
letter in wave 1, we determined the additional amount
remitted to the government by the deadline set in the late
notices, atwhich time additional collection efforts began.
These additional collection efforts, including subsequent
letters, staffing of call centers, and procurement of ex-
ternal collection agencies, are estimated by the govern-
ment to cost approximately two cents for every dollar
collected. We find that, on average, each control letter
resulted in $149.88 of remitted taxes prior to the start of
additional collection efforts, whereas each experimental
letter garnered $241.32 (b = 91.45, SE = 40.97, t(5,197) =
2.32, p = 0.026, d = 0.07).4,5 Although the size of the
experimental letter’s effect is statistically small, in the
context of this tax’s scale, its impact is not insignifi-
cant. This increase of 61% in tax remittance resulted
in an additional $288,335.54 being collected within
10 days of mailing the experimental letter, plus saved
the government approximately $5,766.71 in collection
costs during wave 1 of the experiment. Had the ex-
perimental letter been sent to all 5,199 organizations
that were not owed a tax refund and were late filing
their annual return during wave 1, the government
could have expected to receive an additional $475,438.15
in remittance prior to initiating additional collection
measures, plus saved some $9,508.76 in collection costs.
To further validate our results by replicating them
in the same population and to test for the longer-term
effects of our intervention, we conducted a second
wave of the same experiment for the subsequent (2014)
tax year. Because randomassignment in bothwaveswas
carriedout independently, this two-wavedesignenabled
us to replicate our initial findings and, furthermore, to
examine both whether the effect of our letter had any
year-over-year persistence, and whether the effective-
ness of the experimental letter remained consistent after
repeated exposure or whether organizations habituated
to these changes.
3.4. Results of Wave 2
For the 2014 tax year, 79,912 organizations were due
to file the payroll tax, which served as the setting
for our study; 6,189 of these organizations were
sufficiently late filing their taxes that year that they
were included in the second wave of our experiment.
Figure 2. Time Series of Organizations in Wave 1 Filing Their 2013 Annual Returns by Letter Assignment
Notes. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals calculated each weekend when there was little to no processing of returns. N.S., p ≥ 0.05;
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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When compared with their previously punctual peers,
organizations that were late filers in 2013, and there-
fore were involved in wave 1 of our field experiment
(i.e., they received either the control or experimental
late notice letter), were significantlymore likely to also
be late filing their 2014 tax return (χ2(1, n = 79,912) =
2,012.31, p < 0.001, OR = 3.43, 95% CI [3.24–3.63]) and
to be so late as to receive a 2014 late notice letter,
thereby including them in wave 2 of our field ex-
periment (χ2(1, n = 79,912) = 3,402.02, p < 0.001, OR =
5.94, 95% CI [5.56–6.35]). Thus, of the 6,189 organi-
zations involved in wave 2 of our field experiment,
approximately one quarter of them (n = 1,506) had
also participated in wave 1.
To test for persistence, we examined whether the
2013 (i.e., wave 1) control and experimental letters
had any differential effect on the likelihood that an
organization would miss the subsequent, 2014 tax
deadline. As predicted, we found no evidence that the
effect of our intervention persisted into the subse-
quent tax year, such that the letters had no influence
on the likelihood an organization would miss the tax
deadline (χ2(1, n = 5,293) = 0.00, p = 0.991, OR = 1.00,
95% CI [0.90–1.12]) nor its likelihood of being in-
cluded in wave 2 (χ2(1, n = 5,293) = 0.07, p = 0.793,
OR = 1.02, 95% CI [0.90–1.15]). Therefore, the pro-
portion of organizations in wave 2 that had received
the control (n = 595) and experimental letters (n = 911)
in Wave 1 remained relatively unchanged from the
original 40/60 split. Importantly, however, this lack
of persistence also indicates that wave 2 of our field
experiment is free of selection bias that might have
been produced by condition assignment in wave 1.
Moreover, independent random assignment in both
waves, such that there is no association between
which letter (control vs. experimental) an organiza-
tion received in 2013 and 2014 (χ2(1, n = 1,506) =
0.38, p = 0.538, OR = 0.94, 95% CI [0.76–1.16]) pro-
vides a relatively unconfounded and well-powered
test of whether the effect of our experimental letter is
moderated by repeat exposure (i.e., whether there are
any habituation effects), which we discuss below. Fi-
nally, the lack of persistence of our effects, together
with the fact that our interventionwas effective among
organizations with previous filing experience, sug-
gests that timing is critical and planning promptsmust
be provided at key points during the decision-making
process to be maximally effective.
Replicating our previous results, the experimental
letter in wave 2 significantly reduced the time it took
organizations to file their annual returns by an av-
erage of 5.3 days (b = −5.25, SE = 1.11, t(6,100) =
−4.72, p < 0.001, d = −0.12).6,7 Using a multinomial
regression we observed the same pattern of accelerated
filing behavior prior to the 10-day deadline contained
in the letter (b = 0.49, SE = 0.07, Wald = 54.12, p < 0.001,
OR = 1.63, 95% CI [1.43–1.86]). Similarly, reduced
differences were observed in filing behavior over
the two 10-day periods immediately afterward (1–
10 days after the deadline: b = 0.17, SE = 0.08, Wald =
4.91, p = 0.027, OR = 1.18, 95% CI [1.02–1.37]; 11–
20 days after the deadline: b = 0.06, SE = 0.08, Wald =
0.58, p = 0.447, OR = 1.06, 95% CI [0.91–1.23]). Again,
although additional collection efforts commencing
after the deadline contained in the letter gradually
eroded the effect of the experimental letter, as can be
seen in Figure 3,more than 16weeks passed before the
initial impact of the experimental letter was no longer
significant relative to the control.
In addition to replicating our original results and
testing whether the effects persisted over two years,
our two-wave design also enabled us to test whether
the effect of the experimental letter diminished with
repeated exposure (habituation). To explore this possi-
bility, we submitted our results to an ordinary least
squares regression inwhich the number of days taken by
organizations to file their 2014 annual tax return was
regressed upon wave 2 letter assignment (coded 0 =
control; 1 = experimental letter), whether the orga-
nization had previously received the experimental
letter in wave 1 (coded 0 = had never received the
experimental letter previously, including both those
organizations that had been in the control condition
in 2013 and those that had not received any late notice
letter in 2013; 1 = had received the experimental letter
in wave 1), and their interaction term. As predicted,
this analysis revealed significant effects for receiving
the experimental letter in wave 2 (b = −4.65, SE =
1.21, t(6,098) = −3.85, p < 0.001, d = −0.10) and re-
ceiving the experimental letter the previous year (b =
9.92, SE = 2.39, t(6,098) = 4.15, p < 0.001, d = 0.11), but
the interaction term was not significant (b = −4.14,
SE = 3.07, t(6,098) = −1.35, p = 0.178, d = −0.03). This
nonsignificant interaction suggests that repeated expo-
sure to the experimental letter had no impact on its ef-
fectiveness, and if anything, there is a trend toward the
experimental letter being more effective for those orga-
nizations previously exposed to it.
The negative effect of exposure to the 2013 exper-
imental letter on 2014 filing behavior can likely be
explained by the fact that those organizations that
received a collection letter in wave 1, due to their
tardiness that year, were significantly slower filing
their returns in response to both late notices in wave 2
than were those that had avoided the collection
process in the previous year (b = 7.98, SE = 1.27,
t(6,100) = 6.30, p < 0.001, d = 0.16). Indeed, as can be
seen in Figure 4, when controlling for those organi-
zations that were late filing in wave 1, this negative
effect of the wave 1 experimental letter on 2014 filings
disappears, whereas the positive effect of the 2014
letter remains unchanged (see regression model 2 in
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Appendix Table A3). As well, when an organization’s
on-time collection status in wave 1 is interacted with
their wave 2 experimental letter assignment in a
similar regressionmodel, there is no evidence that the
main effect of the experimental letter (b = −5.92, SE =
1.27, t(6,098) = −4.65, p < 0.001, d = 0.12) is moderated
by an organization’s previous tardiness (b = 2.48, SE =
2.58, t(6,098) = 0.96, p = 0.337, d = 0.02), suggesting that
Figure 4. Effect of Letter Assignment on Time Taken for Organizations to File Their Annual Return in Wave 2
Notes. Results control for having received a late notice the previous tax year. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals. The p-values are
relative to those organizations never exposed to the experimental letter in Waves 1 or 2 (i.e., leftmost bar).
Figure 3. Time Series of Organizations in Wave 2 Filing Their 2014 Annual Return by Letter Assignment
Notes. Error bars represent 95% confidence intervals calculated each weekend when there was little to no processing of returns. N.S., p ≥ 0.05;
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.
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the experimental letter is equally effective for both
those organizations that were not late the previous
year and those that were late two years in a row (see
model 3 in Appendix Table A3). Unfortunately, de-
termining whether the experimental letter is equally
effective for organizations who are habitually late
filing their taxes (i.e., for more than two consecutive
years) goes beyond our data. Note, however, that that
would constitute a relatively small portion of the
population, considering that only a quarter of orga-
nizations in our wave 2 sample were also tardy in
wave 1. That said, we suspect that serially late filers
may experience unique barriers to compliance (e.g.,
inability to pay, lack of intrinsic motivation to pay,
dysfunctional organizational structures) that would
likely not be impacted by our intervention.
As a result of increasing tax-filing compliance, the
experimental letter also increased the amount of taxes
remitted duringwave 2 prior to the commencement of
additional collection efforts. We find that on average
each control letter resulted in $189.75 of remitted
taxes prior to the start of additional collection efforts,
whereas each experimental letter garnered $291.70, a
significant difference (b = 101.95, SE = 38.00, t(5,066) =
2.68, p = 0.007, d = 0.08).8,9 Again, although the ex-
perimental letter’s statistical effect size is small, the
impact is not insignificant. The experimental letter
led to an increase of 54% in tax remittance, resulting
in an additional $309,112.40 being collected within
10 days, and saved the government approximately
$6,182.25 in collection costs during wave 2 of the
experiment. Had the experimental letter been sent
to all 5,066 organizations that were not owed a tax
refund and were late filing their annual return, the
government could have expected to receive an addi-
tional $516,478.70 in remittance prior to initiating ad-
ditional collection measures and saved some $10,329.57
in collection costs.
4. Discussion
This study demonstrates that psychologically informed,
low-cost changes to tax-collection letters can have sig-
nificant benefits for taxation. Specifically, we examined
tax-paying behavior among a population of organiza-
tions that were late filing their annual returns and found
that planning prompts are a viable tool for overcoming
payment procrastination. Our multi-wave experiment
makes several valuable contributions. First, it applies a
new theoretical perspective to a relatively under-
studied component of tax compliance. Drawing on the
insight that people often fail to act on their motiva-
tions, we argue that overdue tax payments might
not only result from the lack of sufficient motivation
or ability to pay, but also from the absence of a con-
crete plan of how to act on those motivations. Impor-
tantly, providing a plan with an explicit deadline and
specific instructions for its implementation appears to
encourage organizational taxpayers to act and aids in
overcoming barriers of procrastination or forgetfulness
after receiving the late notice.
Due to the feasibility constraints of our govern-
ment partner and statistical power considerations,
our experiment was limited to testing only two ver-
sions of the collection letter. As such, we cannot
disentangle the individual contributions of all dif-
ferences between the letters. This limitation is further
compounded by the fact that we do not have any
mediating variables that would enable us to measure
the psychological variables we argue underlie our
effects. However, given the substantive similarity
between the content of the control and the experi-
mental letters, we contend that the most impactful
difference is the provision of concrete instructions
of when, where, and how to act on extant motivations
to file an organization’s taxes. The additional changes
to our experimental letter were highly stylistic in
nature (second-person pronouns, active voice, and
reorganized letter structure) and only intended to
highlight and support our planning prompt manip-
ulation. Given organizations’ previous experience
with filing their EHT returns (over 97% had previ-
ously filed), that they were each sent an initial tax
assessment with instructions to file, and that all de-
tails of how, when, and where to file are readily
available on the government’s web page, it seems
unlikely that our results were simply driven by the
inclusion of any specific information in the letter.
To examine the impact of the changes in our letters
more directly, we ran a short follow-up survey ex-
periment asking student participants (n = 167) to rate
their perceptions of the late notices on several di-
mensions (including the clarity, urgency, seriousness
of punishment, and effectiveness of the letters) and to
choose the areas of the letters that they thoughtwould
be most effective for encouraging organizations to
file their taxes (see the online appendix for detailed
methods and results). The results of this experiment
revealed that participants did not perceive the letters
as significantly different on any of the aforemen-
tioned characteristics (see Appendix Table A4). More-
over, when participants were asked to select the areas
of the experimental late notice that would be most
effective for encouraging organizations to file, the
regions selected are also present in the control let-
ter (see Appendix Figure A1). Neither the planning
prompts nor the deadline date were selected more
often than would be predicted by chance. These
findings lend support to our argument that the in-
formation itself was not likely causing our effects,
rather we suspect that organizing that information
into planning prompts was critical for getting orga-
nizations to file. Nevertheless, future research may
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examine these different elements individually to deter-
mine how critical each is in promoting action.
Second, in addition to the application of a well-
established behavioral insight to the novel intersec-
tion of tax compliance and organizational behavior,
by employing a multi-wave design, this experiment
also makes a unique contribution by examining the
persistence and consistency of our effects over time.
Our study found no evidence that receiving the
experimental letter impacted organizations’ likeli-
hood of filing in a timely fashion the following year,
demonstrating the importance of timing for behav-
ioral interventions. Previous research has shown that
behaviorally informed communications can persist
and impact tax behavior as much as a year later
(Brockmeyer et al. 2019). Moreover, research has found
that implementation intentions, more broadly, can
impact behavior even when there is a long interval
between the time of the intervention and ultimately
enacting the desired behavior (e.g., Nickerson and
Rogers 2010). Although we would not expect spe-
cific planning prompts to impact behavior a full year
later (i.e., after the intervention was removed) given
the mechanisms through which they operate, it was
important to confirm this prediction empirically.
Therefore, our finding suggests that planning prompts
may be most effective when they proximately precede a
decision point.
In addition, although our intervention did not
appear to have effects that persisted across tax years,
organizations also did not habituate to our manipu-
lation and its effects were consistent across repeated
exposures. The fact that our experimental letter was
equally effective after two exposures is critically
importantwhen assessing the policy implications and
longer-term impact of such a behavioral intervention,
especially in the area of tax compliance where orga-
nizations typically repeat the same process year after
year. We suspect that the year between exposures
allows for sufficient memory decay to prevent ha-
bituation. In addition, in this type of context, letters
are only sent to organizations who are late filing their
taxes, and therefore, the vast majority would be ex-
posed to this letter at intervals that were even longer
than one year (e.g., during our experiment, only 25%
of firms who were late in wave 2 were also late the
previous year). We also predict that this lack of ha-
bituation is especially likely in the context of orga-
nizations, where there are often procedural changes
and staff turnover that would cause the letter to be
new to the receiver each year. However, if notices
were sent more often, for example, monthly, we
would predict that organizations’ behavior eventu-
allymay habituate to the changes in the letter, and as a
consequence, we would observe decreased attention
toward our intervention. It would therefore be useful
for future research to confirm that the effectiveness
of providing organizations with planning prompts
remains effective after numerous exposures. More-
over, if the actual process of filing taxes in Ontario
changes significantly (e.g., tax forms are automati-
cally filed and paid in installments by all organiza-
tions), then there would be less possibility for late
payments and our intervention would be less use-
ful. Although our findings contribute to the under-
standing of the longer-term effectiveness of planning
prompt interventions, we would like to encourage
more longitudinal research in this area, to further
our understanding of the temporal duration of be-
havioral interventions.
Third, this experiment is among the first to test the
application of behavioral interventions designed for
individuals in the realm of organizational behavior.
In this instance, we find that despite documented
differences in organizational decision making, plan-
ning prompts that have been shown to be effective for
individuals are also very effective for organizations.
We find that organizations presented with our ex-
perimental letter were significantly more likely to file
their taxes before a set deadline, and the effect of
the letter remained significant for up to 16 weeks
despite sustained collection efforts beginning within
just 10 days. Critically, for our government partners,
early remittance significantly saves on additional
collection costs (as well as costs to the tax-paying
organizations). Future research could explore whether
other behavioral interventions shown toaffect individual
behavior are equally effective at the organizational level
and under what conditions.
In addition, although domestic (vs. foreign) firms,
more experienced firms, and firms with larger pay-
rolls (a proxy for firm size) were found to file their
taxes faster after receiving a late notice, we found that
the effectiveness of our intervention was not mod-
erated by these factors. This lack of moderation
suggests that our effects are likely not driven only by
weakness in organizational procedure or by the or-
ganizations’ inexperience, nor are the effects driven
only by the organizations’ likelihood of benefiting
from social goods supported by taxes. Rather, these
findings lend confidence to the idea that planning
prompts are more broadly applicable and that our
intervention could be effective across a number of tax-
filing processes. Although we were unable to acquire
additional firm-level data from our sample, we do
acknowledge that it would be ideal to have more
information about organizations’ tax-filing processes.
Future research may therefore examine how other
organizational factors—such as the mechanical pro-
cess by which organizations file their taxes, the size
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of their accounting department, or organizational
culture—can interact with behavioral interventions,
like the one studied here.
Finally, not only did this experiment produce be-
havioral field data, which contributes to the growing
literature on organizational tax compliance, it also
advanced the goals of the government and the public
it serves: it saved the government money in terms of
collection costs, saved organizations money in terms
of additional penalties and interest, and increased
collected taxes. Given that implementing this “nudge”
involved zeromarginal costs above those incurred for
the experiment (i.e., the salaries of research staff) and that
we foundnoevidence that repeatedexposure to the letter
diminished its effect,weare encouraged toknow that the
government is implementing the experimental letter as
the standard. Our experiment provides strong evidence
for a readily applicable tool that promotes efficient tax
collection without added enforcement or penalties.
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Endnotes
1The Flesch-Kincaid grade level test was used to measure the reading
difficulty of the letters (Kincaid et al. 1975). Scores on this test
represent a U.S. grade level. The specific reading grade levels were 9.7
for the control and 9.3 for the experimental letter, excluding the
specific planning prompt paragraph.
2The 41 organizations that never filed their returns within the 559
observation days available for wave 1 of the experiment are excluded
from this analysis. Imputing a filing time of 560 days for these or-
ganizations does not substantively change the result.
3To correct for significant positive skewness in the number of days
taken to file a tax return, zskewness = 104.55, a log transformation was
performed, which did not alter the significance of our results. A
nonparametric Mann-Whitney test produced consistent results, U =
4,367,740, p < 0.001.
4During the year 2013, there were 1,117 organizations that had
overpaid their taxes by installments during the year 2013 and, thus,
were owed refunds with their annual return. These organizations are
excluded from these analyses.
5To correct for significant positive skewness in the amount of tax
collected, zskewness = 661.35, a log transformation was performed,
which did not alter the significance of our results. A nonparametric
Mann-Whitney test produced consistent results, U = 3,112,908,
p < 0.001.
6The 87 organizations that never filed their returns within the 195
observation days available for wave 2 of the experiment are excluded
from this analysis. Imputing a filing time of 196 days for these or-
ganizations does not substantively change the result.
7To correct for significant positive skewness in the number of days
taken to file a tax return, zskewness = 46.90, a log transformation was
performed, which did not alter the significance of our results. A
nonparametric Mann-Whitney test produced consistent results, U =
4,009,273, p < 0.001.
8During the year 2014, there were 1,122 organizations that had
overpaid their taxes by installments and, thus, were owed refunds
with their annual return. These organizations are excluded from
these analyses.
9To correct for significant positive skewness in the amount of tax
collected, zskewness = 229.74, a log transformation was performed,
which did not substantively alter our results. A nonparametricMann-
Whitney test produced consistent results, U = 2,941,784, p < 0.001.
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